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Abstract. This paper is a short review of Mamoon (2007) analysis on inequality 
where it is contrasted with growth. The economic processes or institutional dynamics 
that are good for growth may not be a priority if inequalities are the prime consideration. 
For example rule of law and control for corruption are the most salient factors to 
mitigate inequality but though they are also good for growth, it is good regulation 
that takes the lead in growth promotion. China has been benefitting from good 
market regulation - a pro capitalist economic tool kit while suffering from rising 
inequality that may be due to less emphasis on control for corruption.  
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1. Introduction 
he problem of poverty can not be separated from the way in which growth 
is achieved. Hence, today the principle issue in pro poor growth debate 
also relates to inequality. Recent literature suggests that international 
trade and strong institutions are the key determinants of growth (i.e, see Dollar 
& Kraay, 2003; Rodrik et. al., 2004; Glaeser et. al., 2004a, Mamoon & 
Murshed, 2005). It is important to look at the different institutional setups; 
countries may have while working along with the surge of globalization. 
For example, India is a thriving democracy but China, South Korea and 
Taiwan have been growing under one-party dictatorships, the last two eventually 
turning to democracy. Recently, Pakistan has become one of the fastest growing 
economies of the region, even surpassing India, under the one man rule of 
General Musharraf. Among the transition economies, rapid economic growth 
was achieved by Kazakhastan under Nazarbaev. Here one may conveniently 
assume that these countries have performed well under market friendly 
policies and thus successfully achieved robust economic performance. 
However the analogy is not that simple. Market friendly policies may not work 
in the absence of good institutions. The failure of Russian economy and its 
reform process can be attributed to the lack of a supportive legal, regulatory 
and political apparatus. In Latin America little attention has been paid to the 
mechanisms of social insurance and to the safety nets which has resulted in 
the dissatisfaction with market oriented reforms. It may also be the case that 
some institutions may be more important than others. For example, even pro-
market dictators can secure property rights as a matter of policy choice (Glaeser, 
2004a). Similarly, stronger social institutions lead to improved government 
functioning: ‚Education is needed for courts to operate and to empower 
citizens to engage with government institutions (Ibid, 2004: 3)‛. 
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Partly due to the recession in the 1980s, which hit the poor harder 
than the rich, inequality in most Latin American states except for three 
(Colombia, Uruguay and Costa Rica) witness sharp rises. Gini coefficients in 
Latin America have been ranged between 0.45 and 0.60 since early 1950s, 
which are among the highest in the world. The sharp income dispersion has 
been rooted in a highly unequal distribution of land and educational 
opportunities (Cornia et. al., 2004). 
In China income concentration has been rising rapidly since 1985 so 
that the Gini coefficient reached 0.43 by 1995 and remained more or less at 
the same level until recently. The rise in income disparity can be attributed to 
a rise in urban-rural divide arising from a faster expansion of urban activities 
amid active participation of China in international markets. Among South East 
Asian economies, the Gini coefficient for Indonesia increased to 0.38 by 1997 
from 0.32 in 1987-90. In South Asia, inequality also followed a U-shaped pattern, 
though it was less pronounced. In India, the experience of 1990s points to a 
moderate rise in both urban and rural inequality and a larger rise in overall 
inequality due to widening gap between urban and rural areas. In 1990s the urban 
inequality rose to 0.36. The Gini coefficient in Pakistan rose from 0.39 in 1960s 
to 0.41 in 1990s. Much like India, the rise in overall inequality is attributed to 
a sharp rise in rural inequalities. Inequality in Sub Saharan Africa has been 
among the highest in world. There is some evidence of falling urban-rural gap 
but there is rising intra urban and at times intra rural inequalities. For example, 
in Tanzania the Gini coefficient for rural inequality rose from 0.53 in early 
1980s to 0.76 in early 1990s. Similarly for Kenya, the rural inequalities increased 
by 9 points from 1980 to 1992 and stand at 0.49 (Ibid, 2004). 
 
2. Inequality and the inter-dependency factors 
Many recent studies (i.e., see Chen & Ravallion, 2003; Cockburn, 2002; 
Friedman, 2000; Lofgren, 1999) show that international trade is significantly 
related with inequality while institutions and integration are also endogenous (i.e., 
Rodrik et. al., 2004). Any empirical analysis which takes institutions as a pure 
exogenous factor while analysing its effects on inequality may lead to miss-
specification bias. Here on the line of Rodrik et. al., (2004), we assume geography 
is a pure endogenous concept. 
Chong & Gradstein (2004) find strong evidence of bi-directional causality 
between institutions and inequality. Inequality may affect the quality of 
institutions. For example, high inequality will prevent the poor from investing in 
education or the ruling class may not invest in education so that the poor 
majority will not be politically active thus undermining the development of 
necessary social and political institutions. Keefer & Knack (2002) suggests that 
social polarisation negatively affects institutional quality. 
The countries with poor institutions are also likely to have high inequality. 
For example in Russia in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs exploited 
their political power to promote their own interests, subverting the emergence of 
institutions committed to the protection of smaller share holders and 
businesses. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index published by 
Transparency International, among the transition economies, Estonia is 
placed 28, and Hungary 31; whereas Russia is placed 79, and Ukraine 83. In 
these transition economies, weak performance of public institutions, 
infringement of property rights in favour of influential parties, lower willingness 
to use courts to resolve business disputes, lower level of tax compliance and 
higher levels of bribery all have been strongly correlated with inequality 
(Hellman & Kaufman, 2002). Similarly, in several Latin American countries, the 
ruling elites, the military and large businesses impeded smaller business 
interests giving rise to significant informal sector. Chong & Gradstein (2004) 
show that when the political bias in favour of the rich is large, income 
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inequality and poor institutional quality may reinforce each other, 
indicating endogeniety between the two. 
There may also be inter-linkages between various institutions. For example, 
nearly all developed countries are democracies and most developing countries are 
either run under one party system, dictatorships or military regimes. The 
countries with lower levels of economic and human development tend to 
have lower levels of education, limited political rights, weak or non existent 
political competition, lower level of economic freedom and openness, ethno 
linguistic factionalism, the lack of judicial independence and a free press and 
high levels of permissiveness towards corruption. 
Institutions can be differentiated into four distinct categories: 1) Legal, 2) 
Political, 3) Economic and 4) Social. Legal institutions capture the transparency 
and fairness of legal system, political rights of the citizens, State legitimacy, 
freedom of speech, independence of judiciary, enforceability of contracts, police 
effectiveness, access to independent and impartial courts, confidence in judicial 
system in insuring property rights, prevention of improper practices in public 
sphere, control of corruption etc. Political institutions represent political 
stability, democracy, autocracy or dictatorship. Economic institutions include 
state effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue, 
states ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national infrastructure, states 
ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems, independence 
of government economic policies from pressure from special interest groups, 
trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, privatisation, banking 
reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities market and non bank financial 
institutions etc. Social Institutions capture socio economic conditions such as 
health, education and nutrition etc. 
The Legal, political, economic and social institutions are strong in developed 
countries and for developing countries there are mixed experiences. For 
example, intellectual property rights are protected vigorously in the US and most 
advanced societies, but not in many developing countries (Rodrik, 1999). 
Engerman & Sokoloff (2002) link the development of public education as a 
social institution to the democratization as a political process in US. 
According to them, while starting at about the similar level of development in 
the 18nth century, US led the way in setting up a system of common schools 
and promoting literacy, where as in countries in South America and the 
Caribbean these processes were much delayed. Gupta et. al., (1998) finds 
that if government officials use their authority for private gain and indulge in 
corruption that affects the effectiveness of social spending and the formation 
of human capital by perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset ownership and 
unequal access to education. Corruption also affects the government effectiveness 
as it weakens tax administration and can lead to tax evasion and improper tax 
evasion and improper tax exemptions. Higher corruption is associated with 
increases in inequalities in education, land distribution and health spending. 
Wealthy urban elites can lobby the government to bias social 
expenditure toward higher education and tertiary health, which tend to 
benefit high income groups (Ibid, 1998). 
Furthermore, trade opening in societies with weak institutions may lead 
to worse economic policies. For example, those transition economies where 
trade reforms were implemented slowly and the government institutions were able 
to perform well with time, smaller increase in inequality and smaller output 
decline is occurred. However, the transition economies with weak 
government setups have performed as ‘passive globalizers’ and the trade-
to-GDP ratios in them were quite high, partly accounting for capital flight, while 
poverty and inequality was increased (Yudaeva, 2002). 
 
 
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 5(4), D. Mamoon, p.335-339. 
338 
3. What do we find? 
Mamoon (2007) examines how legal, economic, political and social institutions 
fare with different measures of inequality in a cross section framework. Among 
legal institutions, rule of law and control for corruption have a stronger impact on 
inequality than voice and accountability. We find that countries which 
practice democracy are less prone to unequal outcomes especially when it 
comes to wage inequality and income inequality whereas autocracy is 
associated with higher level of wage inequalities but its impact on income 
inequalities are insignificant. Though under good economic management, 
autocracies may redistribute incomes from the richest to the poorest, more 
generally an autocratic set up violates the median voter hypothesis.  
The results also show that political stability is more sensitive to inequalities 
than democracy and autocracy which is to say that the countries which are 
politically stable also form more equal societies. Though in a cross section 
analysis, our results indicate average sample characteristics of countries chosen 
which neutralise the single country case sensitivities and thus may have captured 
the simple observational analogy that most democracies in the world are also the 
ones which are politically stable and economically efficient whereas most 
autocracies, unless they are lead by enlightened leadership eventually suffer 
from unstable or repressed political systems. Economic institutions also 
play an important role in alleviating global inequalities. Whether the 
government is functioning effectively and whether it has a robust fiscal and 
monetary policy seems to have stronger impact on inequality than regulatory 
quality. Education for all, a proxy for social institutions, has a strong 
redistributive power. If education is more equally distributed among the 
population, relative wages of skilled and unskilled labour will have least 
amount of distortions especially when the country opens up to international trade. 
Overall, political stability, control for corruption and rule of law trumps any 
other institutional proxy in reducing inequalities in a country. On the other hand, 
middle income group is most likely to benefit from good functioning institutions 
than any other income group. 
Regarding integration the paper finds that openness is generally related with 
higher wage inequality, though its impact on income inequality is insignificant at 
best. This result is also in line with recent literature. However we also find that 
level of openness or trade policies may carry significant positive effects in 
widening the wage gaps between skilled and unskilled labour. The reason for the 
continuous failure of WTO talks has also been supported by our study as our 
results show that opening up of protected sectors to increased international 
competition by revoking import taxes lead to higher wage inequality. The 
paper recommends more regional trade where by developing countries trade 
among each other if due to protection their exporting capabilities to the 
developed countries have been strangled especially in case of agriculture 
produce. For example, in countries like China and India, the pace of development 
suggests that both countries are fast climbing the technology ladder and would 
form significant pockets of services sector oriented high technology dependent 
production areas which may draw similarities with developed nations in both 
supply and demand and relative factor prices. Trade within developing 
countries may seek to exploit such emerging pockets. Countries like Pakistan may 
also increasingly join in if regional economics is put on priority and conflict 
of interest are resolved or set aside for preparing economic grounds for social 
harmony within their populations. 
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